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INSTRUCTION NO.

Jj

In these instructions certain words and phrases are used which require definition in order
that you may properly understand the nature of the crimes charged and in order that you may
properly apply the law as contained in these instructions to the facts as you may find them from
the evidence. The definitions applicable to Count I, Violation of a Clandestine Laboratory Act,
are as follows:
11

Clandestine laboratory operation1 means any of the following:
a.

purchase or procurement of chemicals, supplies, equipment, or laboratory
location for the illegal manufacture of methamphetamine.

b.

transportation or the arranging for the transportation of chemicals,
supplies, or equipment for the illegal manufacture of methamphetamine.

c.

setting up of equipment or supplies in preparation for the illegal
manufacture of methamphetamine.

d.

illegal manufacture of methamphetamine.

e.

distribution or disposal of chemicals, equipment, supplies or products used
in the manufacture of methamphetamine

"Controlled substance precursors " include:
a)

pseudoephedrine

b)

crystal iodine

c)

ephedrine

"Illegal manufacture of a controlled substance" means:
the compounding, synthesis, concentration, purification, separation, extraction, or
other physical or chemical processing for the purpose of producing

methamphetamine or conversion of methamphetamine to its base form.

INSTRUCTION

NoXP

Before you can find the defendant guilty of Count I, Violation of the Clandestine
Laboratory Act, afirstdegree felony, you must find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that in Salt Lake County on or about February 5, 1999, all of the following elements of the
crime
1)

Said defendant, James Deluna,

2)

a.

knowingly or intentionally possessed a controlled substance precursor with
the intent to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation;
AND/OR

b.

knowingly or intentionally possessed laboratory equipment or supplies with
the intent to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation;
AND/OR

c

knowingly or intentionally conspired with or aided another to engage in a
clandestine laboratory operation
AND

3)

one of the following conditions occurred in conjunction with the clandestine
laboratory operation:
a.

the defendant, James Deluna, possessed a firearm;
AND/OR

b.

the intended laboratory operation was to take place or did take place within
500 feet of a residence,

AND/OR
c.

the clandestine laboratory operation actually produced any amount of a
specified controlled substance,
AND/OR

d.

the intended clandestine laboratory operation was for the production of
methamphetamine base.

If you believe that the evidence established each and all of the elements of this offense
beyond a reasonable doubt, it is your duty to convict the defendant. On the other hand, if the
evidence failed to establish one or more of said elements, you should find the defendant not guilty

INSTRUCTION NO. 2J_
You may infer that the defendant intended to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation
if the defendant:
1)

was in illegal possession of a controlled substance precursor;
OR

2)

illegally possessed or attempted to illegally possess a controlled substance
precursor AND is in possession of any one of the following pieces of equipment:
a.

glass reaction vessel,

b.

separatory funnel,

c.

glass condenser,

d.

analytical balance, or

e.

heating mantle.

INSTRUCTION NO.

2A

If you find the Defendant, James Deluna, GUILTY of Count I, Violation of the
Clandestine Laboratory Act, you must consider which enhancements apply to this case. If you
found the Defendant, James Deluna, NOT GUILTY of Count I, Violation of the Clandestine
Laboratory Act, then you should proceed to deliberate on the remain charges and disregard the
remainder of this instruction.
Assuming you have unanimously agreed that the Defendant, James Deluna, is guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt of Count I, Violation of the Clandestine Laboratory Act, the Court
requires you to further deliberate on the specified enhancements. The Court requires you to
determine as a group, beyond a reasonable doubt, which, if any, of the following conditions
occurred in conjunction with this violation:
a.

the Defendant, James Deluna, possessed a firearm; and/or

b.

the intended laboratory operation was to take place or did take place within 500
feet of a residence; and/or

c.

the clandestine laboratory operation actually produced any amount of controlled
substance, to wit: methamphetamine; and/or

d.

the intended clandestine laboratory operation was for the production of
methamphetamine base.

After you decide beyond a reasonable doubt which, if any, of these enhancements apply to this
case, you should complete the SPECIAL VERDICT form at the end of the instruction packet.

INSTRUCTION NO.
Before you can find the defendant guilty of Count II, Unlawful Possession of a
Controlled Substance, a third degree felony, you must find from the evidence, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that in Salt Lake County on or about February 5, 1999, all of the following
elements of the crime:
1)

Said Defendant, James Deluna,

2)

knowingly and intentionally,

3)

possessed a controlled substance,

4)

to wit: Methamphetamine.

If you believe that the evidence established each and all of the elements of this offense
beyond a reasonable doubt, it is your duty to convict the defendant. On the other hand, if the
evidence failed to establish one or more of said elements, you should find the defendant not
guilty.

INSTRUCTION NO. 2JL
"Possession " means the joint or individual ownership, control, occupancy, holding,
retaining, belonging or maintaining of the items at issue and includes individual, joint or group
possession of the items.
For a person to be a possessor of an item, it is not required that he be shown to have
individually possessed, used, or controlled the item, but it is sufficient if it is shown that he
jointly participated with one or more persons in the use, possession or control of any item with
knowledge that the activity was occurring.
Actual physical possession is not necessary to convict a defendant of possessing certain
items. A conviction may also be based upon "constructive possession. "
"Constructive Possession " exists where the item is subject to the defendant's dominion
and control. Tofindthe defendant had "constructive possession" of a controlled substance, it is
necessary to prove there was a sufficient nexus or connection between the accused and the
controlled substance to permit an inference that the accused had both the power and intent to
exercise dominion and control over the item.

INSTRUCTION NO. Jj
Before you can find the defendant guilty of Count III, Production of a Controlled
Substance, a third degree, you must find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that in
Salt Lake County on or about February 5, 1999, all of the following elements of the crime:
5)

Said Defendant, James Deluna,

6)

knowingly and intentionally,

7)

produced or possessed with the intent to produce,

8)

a controlled substance,

9)

to wit: Marijuana

If you believe that the evidence established each and all of the elements of this offense
beyond a reasonable doubt, it is your duty to convict the defendant. On the other hand, if the
evidence failed to establish one or more of said elements, you should find the defendant not
guilty.

INSTRUCTION NO. XL
In these instructions certain words and phrases are used which require definition in order
that you may properly understand the nature of the crimes charged and in order that you may
properly apply the law as contained in these instructions to the facts as you may find them from
the evidence. The definitions applicable to Count III, Production of a Controlled Substance, are
as follows:
"Production " means the manufacture, planting, cultivation, growing, or harvesting of a
controlled substance.

INSTRUCTION NO.
You are instructed that:
Methamphetamine is a controlled substance.
Marijuana is a controlled substance.
Iodine is a precursor chemical.

INSTRUCTION NO.

J^JO

A person engages in conduct intentionally, or with intent
or willfully with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a
result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or
desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.
A person engages in conduct knowingly, or with knowledge,
with respect to his conduct or to circumstances surrounding his
conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or the
existing

circumstances.

A

person

acts

knowingly,

or

with

knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is
aware
result.

that

his

conduct

is

reasonably

certain

to

cause

the

INSTRUCTION NO. 23.
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the commission of the offense
who directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally
aids another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable
as a party for such conduct.

INSTRUCTION NO,

jtfj*
' "*'

^

The intent with which an act is done denotes a state of
mind and connotes a purpose in so acting.

Intent, being a state

of mind, is seldom susceptible of proof by direct and positive
evidence and may

ordinarily be

statements and circumstances.

inferred

from

acts, conduct,

In the District Court of the Third Judicial District
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff
vt.

VERDICT

JAMES DELUNA,

Caw No.

Miqn.m-tt

Defendant
We, the Jurors impaneled in the above case, find ...tb.e..defend.ant,.
James Deluna.,.. Guilty of CIand£stinje..Lah,...a f i r s t . De.gree.felony.,, as...
charged In Count..I...of. th.e..Inf.QrMtt.Qn.f

Dated J.ty

£

X-2^
oreperson

STATE OF UTAH,

SPECIAL VERDICT

Plaintiff,
v.
JAMES DELUNA,
Case No. 991903035

Defendant.

We, the Jurors impaneled in the above case, have found the Defendant, James Deluna,
GUILTY of Violation of the Clandestine Laboratory Act, as charged in the information.
In so finding, we unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that the following
conditions occurred in conjunction with this violation (check anv and all that apply):
the Defendant, James Deluna, possessed a firearm;
the intended laboratory operation was to take place or did take place within 500
feet of a residence;
the clandestine laboratory operation actually produced any amount of controlled
substance;
the intended clandestine laboratory operation was for the production of
methamphetamine base.

DATED this

day of June, 2000.
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UTCO ASSOCIATES, LTD., a Utah
limited partnership, by and through its
general partner, Robert D. Kent,
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Civil No. 20000339-CA
930904174
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K. DEMARR ZIMMERMAN;
SUMERSET HOUSEBOATS, DIV.
SMI; and JAMES E. SHARPE, JOHN
DOES 1-10,
Defendants-Appellees.

REPLY BRIE* til APPELLANT UTCO ASSOCIATES, LTD.

L

INTRODUCTION

Sumerset and Sharpe do not dispute that the parties consented to jury trial
of UTCO's promissory-estoppel claim1 and Sharpe does not dispute that UTCOfs claims
for promissory estoppel, breach of contract, and misrepresentation are alternative
theories entitled to jury consideration because of differing proof burdens and elements.
UTCO's Brief at 1VI6 Accordingly, UTCO will not discuss these issues further; Sharpe

1

Sharpe and Sumerset are sometimes collectively referred to as "Sharpe" based in part
on the fact that the only contact which IJTCO had with Sumerset was through Sharpe.

and Sumerset have conceded them. Sharpe ignores the trial court's finding that mere
similarity in the claims brought against Sharpe and Zimmerman (now discharged from
bankruptcy) does not create "total" overlap in the facts of their disparate conduct that
would preclude certification under Rule 54(b). Sharpe also forgets the trial court's
finding that UTCO's "adequate remedy" at law was UTCO's breach of contract and
misrepresentation claims in this case, not UTCO's claims against Zimmerman in
bankruptcy. Finally, Sharpe's argument that the trial court properly excluded evidence of
Sharpe's fraud is unpersuasive because fraudulent intent is shown by all surrounding facts
and circumstances.

II.

JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY CERTIFIED UNDER RULE
54(B): THE FACTUAL OVERLAP WAS NOT COMPLETE
AND UTCO PURSUED ALL CLAIMS TO JUDGMENT.

Sharpe incorrectly challenges this Court's jurisdiction and the rule 54(b)
order, saying that the claims against Zimmerman "overlapped" with and were not distinct
or "separate" from claims against Sumerset and Sharpe under Kennecott Corp. v. Utah
State Tax Comm'n. 814 P.2d 1099 (Utah 1991). Sharpe Brief at 20-22. First, Sharpe
ignores the trial court's finding that there was insufficient overlap to preclude rule 54(b)
certification. The trial court rejected Sharpe's "overlap" claim, finding that:
The Court determines that pursuant to Rule 54(b) and the
Utah Supreme Court's decision in Kennecott Corp v. Utah
State Tax Commission. 814 P.2d 1099, 1103 (Utah 1991),
there is no factual overlap preventing certification. For
-2-

example, in the promissory estoppel allegations contained in
the Second Amended Complaint, plaintiff alleged separate
actions by Zimmerman on the one hand and Sharpe and
Sumerset on the other hand.
R. 3211-12 (emphasis added). This put an end to Sharped "fact-overlap" challenge.
Second, a complete reading of Kennecott undercuts Sharpe's juridiction
challenge. The Kennecott Court hesitated to decide (lie rule >4(b) appeal because there
was a total "overlap" in facts for both the certified claims and claims remaining at the trial
court, and because the uncertified had not yet been resolved:
Under the analytical approach we adopt today, the key
question is whether there is factual overlap between the
ostensibly separate claims. Here, the overlap is total. The
taxpayers' claims are all based on the same underlying
facts.... It would be a waste of judicial resources to have
this court learn the facts of the case in order to determine the
propriety of the trial court's decision under article XIII,
section 5 of the Utah Constitution, when at a later time we
would be forced to review a variant challenge to the same
statute on the same facts.
Kennecott. 814 P.2d at 1105 (emphasis added).
This case is different. First, while each defendant here acted wrongfully,
Zimmerman, Sharpe, and Sumerset did different things. The subject of Sharpens focus,
UTCO's promissory-estoppel claim, confirms this. In that claim, UTCO alleged:
"Zimmerman made promises to plaintiff to, among other things, make payments under
the Note. Sharpe and Sumerset made promises to plaintiff to apply the Funds to the

-3-

purchase of the Houseboat and to deliver the Houseboat to Zimmerman's place of
business in Utah." Second Amended Complaint at f 51, 54 (emphasis added), R.568-69.
A borrower's promise to make payments on a note is different from a manufacturer's
promise to ship a houseboat to Utah when the lender sends the manufacturer the Funds.
The trial court recognized these differences in certifying the matter under rule 54(b). See
Certification Order, Addendum L, R. 3211-12. UTCO's claims against Sharpe arise
from his separate unfulfilled promises to use the Funds for the purchase of the Houseboat
and to ship it once Sumerset received the Funds from UTCO and Mr. Nelson. See
Second Amended Complaint atffi[12,13,15,18, 19, 38-40, 51, 53, 64, 65,94-97. R. 563575.

In sum, Sharpe's and Sumerset's liability results from their own acts, not the

separate acts of Zimmerman.
Second, while Zimmerman was not a party to the trial court's September 4,
1996, Judgment, UTCO pursued him to final judgment in the bankruptcy court, which
ultimately granted a discharge. R. 3165-68; 321 l(Trial court found "Zimmerman's
bankruptcy has concluded and Zimmerman obtained a discharge.") The discharge
precluded UTCO from pursing Zimmerman in this action. R. 3211 (Trial court found
"that because of the discharge, the plaintiff has no further recourse against Zimmerman.")
UTCO received partial compensation from Zimmerman during the bankruptcy action. R.
3212, 3149-3164. UTCO's claims against him have been fully adjudicated and do not

-4-

preclude jurisdiction. 1JTCO was entitled to appeal after its claims against Zimmerman
were discharged in the bankruptcy court. Donohue v. Mouille. 913 P.2d 776, 778 (Utah
Ct. App. 1996) (court found that plaintiff must either certify the order, dismiss the
codefendant who filed bankruptcy or seek relief from the automatic stay).
Certification was consistent with Kennecott. The unresolved claims
remaining in the trial court that frustrated certification efforts in Kennecott are not present
here. Kennecott, 814 P.2d at 1105. All justiciable claims have been resolved either in the
bankruptcy court or the trial court. See exhibits attached to UTCO's Memorandum in
Support. R. 3149-68; R.3211-12. This appeal is all that remains.2
Applying the prior rulings of this Court, the trial court Jou nil that its
September 4,1996, Judgment should be certified, and granted UTCO's Rule 54(b)
motion, finding:
Based upon the certified copies of documents submitted by
plaintiff, Zimmerman's bankruptcy has concluded and
Zimmerman obtained a discharge. The documents from the
bankruptcy demonstrate that plaintiffs claims against
defendant Zimmerman have been adjudicated fully in the
bankruptcy action and that because of the discharge, the
plaintiff has no further recourse against Zimmerman . . . The
2

The trial court's decision is certifiable, as stated implicitly in this Court's prior
decision: "the order does not dispose of the matters as to all parties, namely Zimmerman,
it cannot be considered final and in the absence of a Utah R. Civ. P. 54 (¥) certification,
this court has no authority to consider the appeal." UTCO v. Zimmerman. Case No.
970190-CA dated April 30,1998, Memorandum Decision at 1, attached to Brief of
Appellant as Addendum "K"(emphasis added).
-5-

plaintiff does not have any claims remaining against
Zimmerman. Plaintiffs claims against Zimmerman were
adjudicated fully in the bankruptcy action and he has obtained
a discharge. In the bankruptcy action, plaintiff pursued
Zimmerman and obtained certain monies, but not a full
recovery from Zimmerman. Because of Zimmerman's
discharge, plaintiff may no longer pursue Zimmerman in this
action. Finally, the Court determines that 'there is no just
reason for delay' of the appeal. Therefore, based upon the
record and for the reasons stated above and in plaintiffs
memoranda, the Court grants the plaintiffs Motion and
certifies the September 4, 1996 Judgment as a final judgment
under Rule 54(b).
R.3211-12.
In sum, the September 4, 1996, Judgment and the order dismissing UTCO's
promissory-estoppel claim were certified correctly under rule 54(b).

III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY FOUND THAT
UTCO'S ADEQUATE REMEDY AT LAW LAY IN UTCO'S
BREACH OF CONTRACT AND MISREPRESENTATION
CLAIMS.
Sharpe conveniently speculates that the trial court intended UTCO's nowdischarged claims against Zimmerman to be the "adequate remedy at law/' when the
court refused to instruct the jury on UTCO's promissory-estoppel claim. Sharpe Brief at
22-23. Sharpe incorrectly suggests that this is inferred from Sharpe's reference to
UTCOfs claims in bankruptcy court against Zimmerman in Sharpe's Motion for Directed

-6-

Verdict.3 Sharpe Brief at 16, 23. First, the trial court denied the Motion for Directed
Verdict, R. 2416, and allowed evidence on the promissory-estoppel claim. Sharpe
defended the claim until the trial court sua sponte dismissed it at the close of the
evidence, days after denying the Motion for Directed Verdict. R. 2416.4
Second, the trial rourl never mentioned the Zimmerman bankruptcy when
giving its reasons for taking the promissory-estoppel claim from the jury. R. 2606-07,
The stated basis for dismissal left little to speculation; it was concern over double
recovery and "surplusage". R MMh -07 The court said "that the concept of promissory
estoppel basically mirrors the causes of action that are being asserted in this case by the
plaintiff And they'll just be surplusage." R.2606-07, emphases added. Thus, contrary
to Sharped suggestion, the "adequate remedy at law" intended by the trial court lay in
UTCO's claims for Sharpe's breach <>IYonliii< * wid misrepresentations, not claims in
bankruptcy court against Zimmerman.

3

It is undisputed that the bankruptcy involved only Zimmerman and did not include
UTCO's claims against Sumerset and Sharpe for breach of their promise to ship the
Houseboat to Utah after receiving the Funds from UTCO. Sharpe and Sumerset argued
repeatedly that UTCO's remedy was to assert claims against Zimmerman in the
Zimmerman bankruptcy proceeding. R. 2400-01. The trial court flatly rejected this
argument when presented in Sharpe and Sumerset's Motion for Directed Verdict, and the
court stated the essence of UTCO's claim against Sharpe and Sumerset. R. 2396-97.
4

The argument on Sharpe's motion for directed verdict is found at R. 2389-2416.
-7-

Sharpens "authorities" do not change this result. Knight v. Post. 748 P.2d
1097 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), involved a claim for quantum meruit (not promissory
estoppel) where the plaintiff had failed to exhaust two legal remedies. Unlike the plaintiff
in Knight, UTCO pursued its claim against all defendants either in state court or
bankruptcy court.5 The Knight Court was clear, noting that a bankruptcy action did not
necessarily preclude recovery under a mechanics' lien nor toll the time for bringing an
action to enforce the lien. Knight, 748 P.2d at 1100 n.2 (citing Munson v. Risinger. 114
So.2d 59, 61 (La.Ct.App.1959)). Knight teaches that UTCO could, and was required to,
pursue Sharpe in state court and Zimmerman in bankruptcy court simultaneously. Id.
Commercial Fixtures and Furnishing v. Adams, 564 P.2d 773, 774 (Utah
1977), is equally unhelpful to Sharpe. Sharpe Brief at 23. There, a materials supplier
sued a tenant and landlord for the value of improvements, asserting unjust enrichment,
not promissory estoppel. Sharpe cites Commercial Fixtures selectively, saying the Court
5

Sharpe also suggests that Knight requires proof that pursuit of claims in bankruptcy
was fruitless and that UTCO presented no such evidence. Sharpe Brief at 24. However,
as shown infra in Knight, the Supreme Court has required that actions against third parties
must be filed within the appropriate statute of limitations for such actions. Knight 748
P.2d at 1100 n.2 (citing Munson v. Risinger. 114 So.2d 59, 61 (La.CtApp.1959)). UTCO
was pursuing its claims in the bankruptcy action and ultimately obtained certain monies
from that proceeding. R. 3212. Further, Sharpens expert admitted that recovery of funds
by UTCO was speculative because he did "not believe that there is any way to predict the
percentage [of the estate] which UTCO may receive." R.2447. Knight is further
distinguishable from the present case because the Knight plaintiff failed to assert legal
rights in a quantum meruit action which rights were then lost by plaintiff. Knight, 748
P.2d at 1100 (Citing Utschig v. McClone, 114 N.W.2d 854 (Wis. 1962).
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should not imply a contract between UTCO and Sharpe where an express contract existed
between UTCO and Zimmerman. See Sharpe Brief at 28. Sharpe ignores the crucial
clarifying language in the opinion:
The mere fact that a third person benefits from a contract
between two others does not make such third person liable in
quasi-contract, unjust enrichment, or restitution. See 66 Am.
Jur.2d960. There must be some misleading act, request for
services, or the like, to support such an action.
Commercial Fixtures, 564 P.2d at 774 (emphasis added). UTCO met this criteria. Sharpe
and Sumerset committed "misleading acts" and made "requests for services and the like,"
which established UTCO's promissory-estoppel claim. Id. Indeed, the trial court
summarized these actions:
The Court: But, Mr. Atkin, Mr. Nelson, in his trust
account, had Mr. Zimmerman's money. And that money
came from a loan from UTCO. And part of the deal between
Zimmerman and UTCO was that they [UTCO] would get a
lien on this property.
Now assuming for the sake of discussion, which, of
course, we must do, that the testimony that's been offered that
Mr. Sharpe said, you send me the money, I will ship you that
boat, and the interest of the boat was going to be shipped
immediately. It is not the money, it's the loss of the security
interest.

The Court: Mr. Nelson, wasn't told this boat wasn't
built, according to him And that is the evidence to this point
in time.
-9-

Mr. Atkin:

Well -

The Court: He thought the boat was built. He
thought that as soon as the money got there they were going
to put the boat on the truck and drive it here.
R. 2396-97 (emphasis added).
Sharpe then argued that UTCO was unharmed because the money sent by
UTCO to Shaipe was Zimmerman's. Shaipe Brief at 30. The trial court also flatly
rejected this:
The Court: Mr. Atkin, what do you do, maybe I'm
misguided here, but if someone makes you a promise and you
do something in that regard to that promise, even shipping
someone else's money, wiring somebody else's money, and
that person doesn't do what they say they're going to do, it
seems to me there's something wrong with that.
Mr. Atkin: Well, there has to be — there has to be
damages, your honor. There has to be a change of position by
the plaintiff that would have caused damage or detriment to
the plaintiff. And there just isn't any in this case.

The Court: So that's your theory, there is no
damages here? So Mr. Sharpe, in this case, if that's the
evidence, at this point in time, it's that he made an intentional
misrepresentation about shipping the boat immediately, that
he hadn't even built, and that's just too bad. Is that the way
we do business in this country?
Mr. Atkin: Well, your honor, we have to look at who
has standing to complain. And that's Mr. Zimmerman, who
might have had some standing to complain.
-10-

The Court: He didn't make a promise to Mr.
Zimmerman, he made it to Mr. Nelson. Mr. Nelson is the guy
that had the money in his trust account, and he is the guy that
decided whether the fifty-eight thousand was going to be sent.
And I don't believe for a minute Mr. Nelson would have sent
it but for the fact that he got a promise that there was a boat
there to be shipped. There wasn't even a boat built.
R. 2401-2403; see also K. DOJ, 041,2095, 2091-93, 2196-99,2278-79, 2077. Consistent
with Commercial Fixtures, Sharpe's "misleading acts" and "request for services or the
like" allowed UTCO's independent action against them. See also UTCO's Brief at 3-6,
16-23.
A.

UTCO WAS ENTITLED TO PRESENT ALTERNATIVE
THEORIES TO THE JURY.

Promissory estoppel exists "to enable courts to enforce contract-like
promises made iiiiciilorceable by technical defects or defenses." 28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel
and Waiver § 57 (2000). "[Promissory estoppel comes into play where the requisites of
a contract are not met, yet the promise should be enforceable to avoid injustice." Id.
Overlooking this, the trial court erroneously took UTCO's promissory-estoppel claim
from the jury ostensibly because UTCO would have an adequate legal remedy if the jury
found a valid contract. However, when the jury found no contract, no promissoryestoppel claim remained for jury consideration. Thus, UTCO was deprived of a jury trial
on a valid iilleniativv theory -promissory estoppel.

-11-

1.

UTCO WAS NOT REQUIRED TO ELECT BETWEEN ITS
ALTERNATIVE THEORIES PRIOR TO A JURY
VERDICT AND THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
"ELECTING" FOR UTCO.

Whatever ground the trial court advanced (whether the doctrines of
"adequate remedy at law", election of remedies or "surplusage"), it was reversible error to
elect sua sponte for UTCO which alternative remedy the jury could decide. UTCO was
entitled to send breach of contract and promissory-estoppel claims to the jury.6 Not
surprisingly, Sharpe cites no Utah case holding that breach of contract and promissoryestoppel claims must be elected before the jury verdict is reached. Other courts allow the
jury to decide both claims. See e.g., UFE Inc. v. Methode Electronics, Inc.. 808 F. Supp.
1407, 1410 & 1415 (D. Minn. 1992) (after verdict for plaintiff on both promissory
estoppel and breach of contract, trial and appellate court found evidence plaintiff
"proffered to support its promissory-estoppel claim was the same evidence underlying its
breach of contract claim" and "[b]ecause those claims are mutually exclusive as a matter
of law, and because the jury found a . . . contract in fact, [plaintiffs] promissory-estoppel
claims fail") (citing Del Haves & Sons, Inc. v. Mitchell. 230 N.W.2d 588, 593 (Minn.
1975) ('"[pjromissory estoppel is the name applied to a contract implied in law where no

6

The Court in Rosander v. Larsen, 376 P,2d 146, 146 (Utah 1962), stated, "To require
a party to make an election between alternative counts . . . , particularly at the pretrial
stage of the proceedings, would be to emasculate the rule [Rule 8(e), Utah R. Civ. P.] and
to render it meaningless."
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contract exists in fact; and thus doctrine is wholly inapplicable in situations where an
actual contract exists") (parenthetical summary by the Court));) Innovative Material
Systems. Inc. v. Santa Rosa Utilities. Inc., 721 So.2d 1233,1233 (Fla. Ct.,\pp 1998)
("Pursuant to our rules of civil procedure, a party may assert inconsistent claims or
defenses in a single pleading. An election between inconsistent remedies need only be
made before the entry of judgment") (emphasis added); Town East Ford Sales, Inc. v.
Gray. 730 S.W.2d 796, 811 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) ("Under the doctrine of election of
remedies, if a plaintiff pleads more than one theory of recovery, he need not make an
election between them until after the verdict. He is entitled to the greatest relief under
either theory that the verdict will support.") (citation omitted) (emphasis added) See
generally Harris-Dudley Plumbing Co. v. Professional United World Travel Ass'n
(WTA). Inc.. 592 P.2d 586, 588 (Utah 1979) (After judgment of lien foreclosure and
judgments against lessor and lessee, Courtfound."'It should of course be observed that
while all possible avenues of relief may be pursued simultaneously, there can be but one
satisfaction of the debt.") (emphasis added); Martindale v. Adams, 777 P.2d 514, 516-17
(Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("While Martindale is entitled to collect the amount of his judgment
only once, the court could certainly enter both personal judgments and an order
foreclosing the mechanic's lien, allowing Martindale the option of choosing his method
for a single recovery.") (emphasis added); Council of and for the Blind of Delaware
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County Valley. Inc. v. Regan. 709 F.2d 1521, 1550 n.76 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("Mere
existence of a remedy at law has not sufficed to warrant denial of equitable intervention:
rather, as the [U.S.] Supreme Court has declared, 'the legal remedy both in respect to the
final relief and the mode of obtaining it, [must be] as efficient as the remedy which equity
would afford under the same circumstances.") (quoting Gormley v. Clark, 134 U.S. 338,
349 (1890) (emphasis added)). In sum, the trial court incorrectly took UTCO's
promissory-estoppel claim from the jury, over UTCO's objections.7

7

R. 2606-07; 2610-11. Sharpe cites Chartiers Valley School District v. Virginia
Mansions Apartments, Inc., 489 A.2d 1381 (Penn. 1985) and Justice v. United States, 6
F.3d 1474 (11th Cir. 1993) and argues that although UTCO's legal claims were
unsuccessful they were nonetheless adequate. Sharpe Brief at 25-26. Chartiers involved
a school district's pursuit of equitable remedies to recover a tax claim, though the city
failed to pursue the statutorily-provided remedy for recovery of tax claims, the statute
offered no equitable recovery of tax claims, and the statute of limitations had run. The
court held: "[C]ourts of equity will not relieve a party from the consequences of an error
due to his own ignorance or carelessness when there are available means which would
have enabled him to avoid the mistake if reasonable care had been exercised." Id. at
1391-92 (citations omitted). Here, UTCO pursued all its legal remedies and was not
negligent. Chartiers is inapposite. In Justice, the case was dismissed without prejudice
for failure to prosecute and failure to comply with court orders after the statute of
limitations had run. The plaintiff filed another action and argued that the statute was
equitably tolled during his prior case. The court ruled equitable tolling did not apply
because plaintiff could have continued in his original case by filing a motion to
reconsider, a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment, and an appeal of the dismissal.
See id. at 1481. Sharpe cites a footnote in Justice quoting Thompson v. Allen Co., 115
U.S. 550, 554 (1885). However, Thompson is readily distinguishable because plaintiff
had a judgment, was granted a legal remedy, tried unsuccessfully to execute on the
judgment, and then returned to court and requested an equitable remedy. See id. at 554.
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Even without a "contract", UTCO could recover against Sharpe through
promissory estoppel because UTCO reasonably relied on Sharpe's hollow promises to its
detriment Ouagliana v. Exquisite Home Builders. 538 P.2d 301, 310 (Utah 1975) (Court
held defense of no consideration "would avail nothing, because of the applicability of the
doctrine of promissory estoppel").8 IJTCO proved its promissory-estoppel claim,
showing that Sharpe received the Funds based upon his promise to ship the Houseboat to
Utah, a promise which he never kept. But because the trial court erroneously dismissed
the claim, when the jury found no contract, R.1672, UTCO could not recover in equity,
even though evidence established the promissory-estoppel claim I JTCO was and is
entitled to a jury verdict on its promissory-estoppel claim.
TV

UTCO RELIED ON THE MISREPRESENTATION

Citing no evidence or trial court ruling, Sharpe claims incredibly that they
can just walk from their actions because UTCO never relied on their representations.

8

See also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90 ("A promise which the promisor
should reasonably expect to induce action . . . on the part of the promisee . . . and which
does induce such action . . . is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of
the promise."); Heathcote Assoc, v. Chittenden Trust Co.. 958 F. Supp. 182, 188 (D. Vt.
1997) ("Promissory estoppel is an equitable doctrine designed to prevent 'injustice and
unconscionable advantage1 where an exchange of promises did not create a binding
contract.") (citations omitted) (Vermont follows Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90).
Utah adopts the Restatement Second formulation of the doctrine. Andreason v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 848 P.2d 171, 175 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Promissory estoppel applies
"only where there is no agreement, where the promise is gratuitous, and there is
unbargained-for-reliance." Heathcote, 958 F. Supp. at 188.
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Sharpe Brief at 21-24. They simply ask the Court to assume that the trial court found that
UTCO's reliance was insufficient as a matter of law. This is baseless. R. 2606-07. The
record is devoid of such an important ruling. R.2606-07.
Further, Mr. Nelson testified unequivocally that UTCO would not have
loaned the money if it did not believe that Sharpe and Sumerset would ship the
Houseboat:
Mr. Nelson: After we talked about those three things I
then confirmed with him that if I would wire $58,384.00 that
he would then ship the houseboat, as was our discussion. And
he said yes.
Q.
That's important. You're very certain he said
that to you?
A.
I'm as certain as I'm sitting here. And I was
shocked when I heard him say today the conversation never
took place. I would have never wired the money, which I did,
and he received. I would have never wired the money if he
hadn't agreed to what we just talked about.
R. 2198-99.
Mr. Nelson also confirmed that the arrangement with Zimmerman required
that UTCO receive an invoice, the registration for the Houseboat (MSO) and wiring
instructions from Sumerset as it had four times before. R. 2195-97, 2278-79. Mr. Nelson
testified that on December 1, prior to closing the loan, he received from Sharpe the
invoice and MSO describing the Houseboat and wiring instructions requiring UTCO to
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send the Funds to be sent to Sharpe. R. 2195, Exhibits 7-9. And, Sharpe sent the MSO
and invoice so UTCO could accurately describ i Houseboat in its loan documents with
Zimmerman. R. 2184-85. Finally, Mr. Nelson testified that the parties did business on
three prior occasions where UTCO received a security interest in the houseboats and then
Sumerset sent them R 2196,2278-79. See also UTCO's Brief at 18-20; R. 563, 641,
2095,2091-93, 2196-99, 2278-79, 2077. This puts av

i to Sharpens claim that: "the

undisputed evidence established that UTCO's decision to loan $60,000 to Mr.
Zimmerman and the loan itself occurred before the alleged promise." Sharpe Brief at 23.
UTCO's evidence established reliance and entitled IJTCO to a jury verdict on
promissory-estoppel.
Finally, Sharpe suggests that because UTCO had loaned the money to
Zimmerman, UTCO could have no interest in the Funds wired to Sharpe and therefore,
UTCO suffered no harm. Sharpe's technical theory ignores the realities the evidence
established. Zimmerman promised UTCO a $58,384 security interest in the Houseboat.
R. 699-709, 2196-99, 2278-79. Sharpe's promise, as Sharpe admitted, induced UTCO to
send the Funds to Sumerset. R. 2060-62, 2092-93. Sharpe testified that he had a "little
trail going" or "course of dealing" with UTCO, whereby UTCO would send money and
obtain an interest in a boat which had been or would be shipped by Sharpe to Utah. R.
2092-93. Sharpe also admitted he never told Nelson that he would apply the $58,384
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payment to the balance Zimmerman owed Sharpe on another boat. R. 2077. Shaipe also
testified that when he was sending MSOs to Nelson, he understood that Nelson "would be
using that as collateral on the boat" and that the MSO was required to license the boat in
another state. R.2095. Finally, Sharpe admitted that the boat described in the MSO and
other documents sent to Nelson "was never manufactured by Sumerset" R.2097-98. On
cross-examination, Sharpe admitted that his answers to interrogatories established that the
$58,384 was applied the same day it was received to the balance due on the other boat.
R.2148-50; see also R.2196-2202. Finally, Mr. Nelson testified that he subsequently
discovered that the boat with the serial number on the MSO Nelson received had been
sold to someone else. R. 2210-11.
In sum, UTCO's overwhelming evidence established that it was damaged
because it relied on Sharpens promises and misrepresentations. Thus, UTCO
convincingly established every element of its promissory-estoppel claim.
V.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY EXCLUDING EVIDENCE
SHOWING THAT SHARPE CHANGED SERIAL NUMBERS
AND SOLD THE HOUSEBOAT TO ANOTHER PARTY,

Sharpe does not question UTCO's authorities demonstrating that all
surrounding circumstances in a fraud action must be viewed to assess fraudulent intent.
See UTCO Brief at 20-23. Sharpe incorrectly suggests that the trial court used proper
discretion to admit relevant evidence, Sharpe Brief at 31-33, and that UTCO only showed
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a "technical violation of the hull identification statute" which, they say, is inadmissible
under Utah R. Evid P! ules 402 and 403.9 Sharpe Brief at 37. Statutory violatioi is are
proper for jury consideration in determining whether Sharpe committed fraud or negligent
misrepresentation. See Ryan v. Gold Cross Services. Inc.. 903 P.2d 423,426 (Utah 1995)
("It is a general rule of Utah law that violation of a safety standard set by statute or
ordinance constitutes prima facie evidence of negligence.") (cited with approval in
Adkins v. Uncle Bart's. Inc.. 2000 UT 14, f 20,1 P.3d 528).
That was not the only purpose of UTCO's evidence. UTCO was entitled to
show that Sharpe reassigned the serial numbers to hide their fraud I'his Court has
confirmed that, "[a] Court may look to ah of the surrounding facts and circumstances and
a continuing pattern of wrongful behavior is one indicator of fraudulent intent

"

Harline v. Barker. 854 P.2d 595, 602 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (emphasis added) (citation
omitted); see also Bails v. Gar. 558 P.2d 458 (Mont. 1976) (holding that fraudulent intent
must be determined in light of all surrounding circumstances); Ledbetter v. Webb. 711
P.2d 874 (N.M. 1985) (holding that facts and circumstances surrounding a transaction
may provide clear and convincing evidence of fraudulent intent). "The existence of
fraudulent intent is a factual question, which may be inferred from all of the attendant

inconsistently, Sharpe says: "No serial numbers were altered or changed", Sharpe
Brief at 15, but later admits that he did "merely a reassignment on paper of a serial
number to avoid a gap in serial numbers." Sharpe Brief at 37. Though the alteration has
been admitted, Sharpe finds it more palatable to call it a "reassignment."
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circumstances. It necessarily involves weighing the evidence presented and assessing the
credibility of witnesses—tasks largely within the province of the fact-finder." Selvage v.
JJ. Johnson & Assoc, 910 P.2d 1252, 1262 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (emphasis added).10
Sharpe vigorously tried to keep out evidence showing the altered serial
numbers, saying it lacked relevance because it occurred three months after the UTCO
transaction.11 However, subsequent conduct supports an inference of prior intent not to
fulfill a promise or representation. See, e^g., Miller v. National Am. Life Ins. Co.. 126
Cal. Rptr. 731 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976). Ultimately, the very nature of fraud claims requires
proof of all circumstances at all times f,[s]ince fraud is usually denied, it must be inferred
from all facts and circumstances . . . including subsequent conduct." Garden State
Standardbred Sales Co. v. Seese. 611 A.2d 1239, 1243 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (emphasis
added).

"Citing In re Beeslev, 883 P.2d 1343, 1349 (Utah 1994); State v. Delanev. 869P.2d4,
6 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); State v. Harmon. 854 P.2d 1037, 1040 n.4 (Utah Ct. App. 1993),
aflPd 910 P.2d 1196 (Utah 1995); State v. Garrett. 849 P.2d 578, 582 (Utah Ct. App.),
cert, denied. 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993).
n

Sharpe sought support in State v. Winward. 909 P.2d 909, 913 (Utah Ct. App. 1995),
saying simply that fraud claims like other claims are governed by the Utah Rules of
Evidence. Sharpe Brief at 26-27; 31-32. However, Winward decided an issue in a
criminal forgery case where the trial court erred in assuming that the State would
ultimately establish that victims had been defrauded by defendant's forgery of a check
made payable to someone other than the victims. Winward, 909 P.2d at 913. Here,
Sharpe's acts prove the fraud perpetrated against UTCO directly, not via a third party.
Winward is therefore inapposite.
-20-

Sharpe also alleged that evidence of changing the serial numbers was
• . :d have been excluded under Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence. But in

excluded i

Utah, the exclusion of evidence under rule 403 is reviewed under a harmful error
standard:

Mf

[a]n erroneous decision to admit or exclude evidence does not constitute

reversible error unless the error is harmful.'" Jouflas v. Fox Television Stations. Inc.. 927
P.2d 170, 173 (Utah 1996) (quoting Cal Wadsworth Constr. v. Citv of St. George, 898
P.2d 1372,1378 (Utah 1995)). Harmful error occurs where "the likelihood of a different
outcome in the absence of the error is 'sufficiently high so as to undermine confidence in
the verdict.1 " Id. at 174 (quoting State v. Knight, 7341'

! M3, 920 (T Jfc ill 1987)).

Harmful error occurred here. The following evidence was admitted:
1.

A houseboat matching the MSO and invoice sent by Sharpe was

never constructed by Sumerset; R. 565, 643,2097-98;
2.

The Houseboat did not even exist when Sharpe received UTCO's

$58,384 though Sharpe promised to send the Houseboat after receiving the Funds, R. 565,
643, 2097-98;
3.

The Houseboat whose serial number appears on the invoice and

MSO given to UTCO was sold to another person, R.2211.
While UTCO's evidence of the altered numbers is compelling, even
damning evidence, that should had been laid before the jury, confirming Sharpe's
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fraudulent intent, and completing UTCO's claims for fraud and negligent
misrepresentation. Preclusion of evidence from which Sharpens fraud may be inferred
created prejudicial harm to UTCO. Confidence in the jury verdict is undermined by the
exclusion of evidence of Sharpens fraud. The jury's reaction would be predictable; the
outcome of the trial would have been different.
In sum, evidence of Sharpe's and Sumerset's fraudulent intent — shown also
by the altered serial number and subsequent sale of the second houseboat — was not only
relevant but necessary to UTCO's fraud claim. Excluding the evidence was highly
prejudicial, and constitutes reversible error. UTCO is entitled to a new trial on its claims
for fraud, negligent misrepresentation and punitive damages.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, UTCO requests that the trial court's judgment be
vacated, and that this action be remanded for proceedings on UTCO's causes of action for
promissory estoppel, fraud, negligent misrepresentation and punitive damages.
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